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threats to a sustaiNaBle future:
water accumulatioN aNd coNflict iN latiN america*
By Rutgerd Boelens, Mourik Bueno de Mesquita, Antonio Gaybor and Francisco Peña**
InTroducTIon
In Latin America, debates over natural resource manage-ment policies and legislation fill discussion forums. This is a needed discussion as coherent policies that both promote 
democratic, equitable water use systems and also safeguard the 
sustainability of water resources are rare in the region.1 The 
absence of effective water regulation that considers the common 
interest and long-term water availability results in poor manage-
ment and use of natural resources, driving explosive conflicts.2 
As in many regions of the world, there is growing demand and 
competition for access to water in Latin America. Agricultural, 
industrial, mining and energy companies, as well as large cities 
and housing developments, have altered socio-natural geography 
and are changing the rural panorama profoundly.3 These recent 
demands are competing with existing water rights and ignoring 
local water management rules in rural communities and indig-
enous people’s territories.4 Moreover, climate change and eco-
system degradation are further reducing water availability in the 
region.5
Generally, new water reform processes have done little to 
curb this situation and some have even worsened it. In many 
cases in Latin America, elites and corporations have taken 
advantage of government interventions.6 New international 
privatization policies trample over the water rights of indigenous 
and other rural peoples, monopolizing water access and control.7 
This article reviews the general context and issues of water 
governance in Latin America and analyzes the accumulation of 
management power by a few elites through modern extractivist 
policies and neoliberal governance. Using case studies in Ecuador, 
Mexico and Peru, this article also illustrates how the prevailing 
water economic and policy models lead to a deepening of 
societal water conflicts, triggering reactions “from below.” 
The conTexT oF WaTer governance
Studies in Latin America have shown a serious disconnect 
between water laws and actual governance. This is particularly 
evidenced by fragmented enforcement of these regulations with 
separate agencies administering different water uses.8 These 
agencies take actions that are often contrary to public interests 
and collective rights.9 State projects and water management 
agencies also favor political agendas, often creating economic 
opportunities for elites and government players.10 
As a reaction to the Latin American government’s disjointed 
and inefficient efforts to manage water resources, there is 
consensus among most of the region’s stakeholders–both 
groups with investment power and indigenous organizations, 
promoting a move toward decentralized water management.11 
Water management agencies have thus initiated decentralization 
and privatization schemes that have transferred some authority 
to local or municipal authorities, user groups, private companies, 
and public-private institutions.12 However, redefining water 
policy is difficult given the varied ideologies and interests held 
by the relevant stakeholders. 13 Among the issues discussed 
is whether water can, or should, be treated as a privatized com-
modity rather than as a fundamental, non-transferable human 
need.14 Discussion also centers around what roles the State and 
private sectors should play in decentralizing water governance, 
as well as whether market forces could effectively allocate water 
to meet various needs.15 Even if these difficult ideological ques-
tions are answered, current Latin American governance structures 
provide a challenging platform for the effective implementation 
of new water management ideas. In some cases, weak agencies 
run by bureaucrats or local elites leave little room for multi-actor 
participation.16 Therefore, even if the government takes action 
to decentralize or privatize water services and establish water 
markets they are face inadequate regulation and enforcement.17 
Furthermore, central government agencies also reject and 
supplant local and indigenous water management initiatives.18 
In general, cultural practices of water management are not taken 
into consideration in national lawmaking; society is portrayed as 
homogenous, with no room for differing water rights or forms 
of water governance.19 Water policies and laws often assume 
that simply adopting official legal norms will work to shape 
and standardize the multi-faceted reality of water management, 
creating a “modern”, “efficient” and “rational” management 
system.20 Therefore, these methods of local water management 
are discriminated against, and water rights are instead turned over 
to “modern production and producers” – legally and illegally.21 
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These centralized practices have disrupted a localized, plural-
istic water management system that has existed for centuries, 
especially in irrigation-based communities that have developed 
management practices by incorporating both ancient water tradi-
tions and modern norms.22 
Water accumulation and control by the few is a long-standing 
problem in Latin America. Recent national and international 
policies, combined with the economic power of multinational 
corporations, make this problem more pressing than ever 
before. Water thievery by these privileged stakeholders in times 
of increasing scarcity, is leading to numerous conflicts, most 
of them local.23 Unfortunately, these conflicts are usually not 
mentioned in the national or international media.24 The few local 
conflicts and protests that do reach the national media, which is 
dominated by the ruling political and economic power sectors, 
are immediately demonized.25 
Latin American is not the only place where public water 
policies are problematic. International interest in coordinating 
better water management and enacting laws to enable local deci-
sion-making is growing.26 This vision calls for a greater decen-
tralization of power from national authorities to local watershed 
organizations, where local citizens would have a voice in decid-
ing how to allocate water resources.27 The following sections 
present some Latin American examples from Ecuador, Peru and 
Mexico that highlight the issues of water governance.
ecuador: concenTraTIng WaTer In agrI-BusIness 
Ecuador has witnessed two simultaneous growing trends 
over the last three decades: the increase in water use for agricul-
ture and the development of irrigation for particularly profitable 
crops.28 In the field, this is producing a certain type of com-
modities.29 In the past, exports were mainly dry land crops, but 
current exports now require higher irrigation water content.30
Irrigated cultivation of certain commodities has become a 
necessary condition for competitiveness in the international and 
national markets where costs are low and the selling prices are 
high.31 Some crops, such as bananas and flowers, would never 
reach the international market without irrigation.32 The main 
exporters of these water-intensive crops are the countries of 
the South; in Ecuador, for example, all corporate agriculture 
(“agribusiness”) for export is irrigated.33 This practice has 
spread throughout Latin America, including growth in Mexico, 
Colombia, and Peru. The domestic large-scale agriculture 
market is also highly extractive of water resources, as evidenced by 
water-demanding sugar cane production.34 In contrast, agriculture 
for domestic consumption from small and medium farms, including 
coffee and cacao for export, is not irrigated for most crops.35
This asymmetry helps explain the highly differentiated 
dynamics of production and reproduction in these distinct 
types of agriculture. In Ecuador, agribusiness profits for some 
crops are high while profits for other crops are extremely low or 
non-existent, especially for most small farmers.36 Thus, to 
narrow the specificity of the agricultural crisis, only small farm-
ing has a crisis while large-scale agribusiness is booming.37 
Agribusiness hoards the best land, almost all the water, and all 
the profit.38 Ecuador is heavily concentrating water with the 
industrial few - this is the age of water dispossession.39 
Neoliberal policy has given national and multi-national 
power groups a normative framework to ensure their monopo-
lization of Ecuador’s water and land.40 Water is plundered two 
ways: formally, through concessions or authorizations granted 
by the Ecuadorian government, or illegally.41 This historical, 
long-standing process has continued to grow over these last 
decades.42 The concentration of water in the hands of a few 
mirrors the similarly inequitable distribution of land in Ecuador. 
According to official figures, rural and indigenous populations 
with community-based irrigation systems account for eighty-
six percent of users, but have only twenty-two percent of the 
irrigated land area.43 What is worse is that these populations 
have access to only thirteen percent of total water flow whereas 
the private sector, representing one percent of agricultural 
production units, has amassed sixty-seven percent of the water.44 
When it come to land distribution, three quarters of farms in the 
country account for only twelve percent of arable area, while the 
two percent of farms owning larger than one hundred hectares 
account for forty-three percent of the national total.45 Water, like 
land, is becoming increasingly scarce, and most irrigation-ready 
water has already been allocated formally or seized illegally to 
national or international corporations.46
Examining some examples reveals the magnitude of this 
water theft. Water monopolies are evident in three parishes 
in the Ecuadorian province of Imbabura where large farms are 
allocated ninety-one percent of the flow and only nine percent 
is left for small and medium farms.47 In the lower Guayas river 
basin, case studies of six rivers show that seventy-six percent 
of water flow is used by sixty-one companies, while nearly one 
thousand small and medium farms are left with the remainder.48 
In the Guayas province, some sixty-two companies formally 
receive water for irrigation at an average rate of six hundred 
liters per second, an amount that could irrigate one thousand 
small farms on the Ecuadorian coast.49 It is common in these 
areas for large companies to block an entire river without 
government authorization to use all or part of its flow.50
Of further concern, some large companies control the entire 
production process, including the transformation of products, 
the marketing of inputs, and capital goods.51 In Ecuador, an esti-
mated 400,000 hectares of farmland (out of eight million total) 
are dedicated primarily to agribusiness and the industrial pro-
duction of sugar cane.52 This area constitutes only five percent 
of the country’s farmlands but demand at least 400,000 liters per 
second of water.53 To put this in perspective, this flow rate is 
eighty percent of the total volume granted by the entire country 
in 2008 (499,000 liters per second).54 
Increasingly, this concentration of water rights and use 
in the hands of a few creates conflict with and mobilization by 
the larger population. These conflicts have historically been 
localized as the farmers and rural residents who are affected 
cannot afford to oppose the more powerful organizations.55 How-
ever, increasingly, conflicts have begun to branch out from the 
local level to become regional, and even national, mobilizations.56 
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mexIco: concenTraTIng WaTer rIghTs In a 
counTry WITh hIgh socIal PolarIzaTIon 
In modern Mexico, it is not only water rights that are being 
concentrated but wealth as well. Scholars estimate that fifty to 
seventy-five percent of Mexico’s population can be classified as 
poor.57 Half of them are in “food poverty,” a federal classifica-
tion whereby their income is not enough to provide the calories 
required to survive.58 In the year 2008, the wealthiest ten percent 
received thirty-six and a half percent of the nation’s income, 
while the poorest ten percent received a mere four and a half 
percent.59 Fifty families repeat and interweave their names 
on lists of the country’s most industrial, financial and service 
groups, thirty-nine of which are among the country’s richest 
families.60 The deciding threads of Mexican economic life are 
held by a small, powerful ruling class.61 
Post-revolution Mexico, which for decades claimed to grant 
social rights and promote “balance among production factors,” 
has instead driven the concentration of wealth to favor the most 
powerful economic groups over the past thirty years.62 For 
example, the political class transferred government property to 
private ownership in exchange for juicy bribes to top officials.63
Similarly, there has been a wave of water rights concentra-
tion by large landowners (mainly in northwestern and northern 
Mexico), and by industry, especially those using large volumes 
of water. Examples can be seen in the food industry, chemical 
plants, cement plants and mining industry (particularly open-pit 
mines using huge quantities of water to separate metal ores by 
leaching).64 Real estate developers also purchase low-priced 
agricultural water rights to transfer for urban use.65 These devel-
opers increasingly expropriate the water of rural communities 
and small localities to supply resort developments (Acapulco 
and Cancún for example) and expropriate community springs to 
promote “green” tourism.66
In such a socially polarized country, this water concentra-
tion is not as visible as it should be. The media tends to conceal 
the realities about the concentration of water rights and uses, 
claiming that water is scarce due to global warming, and waste 
by municipalities.67
Finding legal documentation of this water concentration 
is no easy task. The Mexican Public Register of Water Rights 
(REPDA) is an unreliable instrument with rampant under-
registration of actual use, disclosing little about concessions 
realities.68 Not recording the water used, or under-recording, 
is common practice in Mexico and is often tolerated or even 
promoted by the agencies responsible for enforcing the law.69 
Although federal administrators often complain that small and 
medium farms are the ones to blame, there is evidence that 
industry, urban water supply companies, and even the govern-
ment are guilty of under-reporting actual usage.70 For this reason, 
inequality in accumulation of water rights is revealed through 
direct evidence, such as the size of water facilities, production 
volumes, amounts of wastewater discharged, and the like.71
This under-recording reveals at least two different things. 
First is the existence of a legal pluralism in which indigenous 
and rural communities do not feel it necessary to register their 
water use, simply because this use is perceived to be based on 
their local and historical water sources and rights.72 The second 
revelation is that large landowners who under-record avoid 
paying for their water rights, demonstrating the power of the 
Mexican elite in conjunction with governmental complicity.73 
Corruption also enables major under-recording of industrial 
water use and pollution by large industries.74
Water rights are no exception to the overall concentration of 
wealth throughout Mexican society. The government’s asserted 
efforts to incorporate society into the water management respon-
sibility are far from the truth. Watershed councils, theoretically 
designed to assist this management and build consensus, don’t 
work because they have become yet another arena for deal-
making by controlling elites.75 The councils systematically 
exclude rural groups, small businesses, environmental organiza-
tions and social platforms.76 For example the construction of the 
La Parota dam (designed to supply tourism businesses in Aca-
pulco) was completed without notice from the watershed agen-
cies supposedly responsible for sustainable water management.77 
Conflicts over water continue to increase in number, intensity, 
and regional coverage.
Peru: naTural resource governance and  
socIo-envIronmenTal conFlIcTs 
The recent history of water governance in Peru demon-
strates the contradiction between nationalization efforts by 
reform governments in the 1970s and a push for privatization in 
recent decades.78 Common themes in this recent history include 
the denial of rural communities and small farmers’ management 
of their own water sources, the concentration of water access 
with the few, and the centralizing of water control in government 
agencies and economically dominant sectors.79 When Alan Gar-
cía took office as President in 2006, he aggressively promoted a 
neoliberal policy that included the total opening of investment in 
agro-export, mining, hydrocarbon extraction, and forest conces-
sions.80 He also declared social protests to be “anti-system.”81 
In July and August 2008, the Peruvian government prepared 
a portfolio of ninety-nine legislative decrees to fill the gaps in 
Peru’s policies on natural resources, environment, water, land 
access, and the management and organization of rural and native 
communities.82 These decrees ushered in a Trade Cooperation 
Agreement, generally known as the Free Trade Agreement, with 
the United States and intensified neoliberal economic policy.83
The Amazon indigenous peoples’ movement led protests 
against these legislative decrees which threatened their territo-
ries and livelihoods.84 They argued that the national government 
was not recognizing their rights to territory, natural resources, 
and their cultural systems.85 These groups pointed out that Peru’s 
Constitution obligated the government to consult them before 
any legislation involving them.86 The government’s response 
has been both counterproductive and repressive.87 The conflict 
led to the violent repression in Bagua, in the Amazon region.88 
And while the government made some concessions, its leth-
argy and lack of political will gave indigenous peoples little to 
no hope.89 The same goes for the protests by Andean peoples 
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and communities about mining companies.90 The relationship 
between government and civil society is quite fragile and there 
is no productive dialogue.91 Admittedly, this dynamic has earned 
some indigenous movements political presence and influence in 
Peru92—for example, the government is promoting the legaliza-
tion of land titles and family ownership of land in rural commu-
nities of the Highlands93—but the successes are limited.94 The 
formalization of water rights among as groups and individuals 
ultimately grants mining companies access to water and land 
owned by communities.95 Rural households are threatened 
with the disappearance of community farming and communal 
resource organization.96 These conditions are encouraging youth 
to migrate to seek alternatives in cities or mining.97
A new water law, drafted by a team of professionals in urban 
Lima, enacted with little debate in Peru’s congress,98 speaks 
broadly of integrated water resource management by water-
sheds.99 This new law, however, actually reinforces top-down 
management, creating local offices that are strongly dependent 
on their central offices.100 This practice promotes watershed 
councils that do not effectively involve constituents.101 More-
over, though the law makes vague claims to regulate the “usage 
and customary” rights of rural and indigenous communities, in 
practice it leaves significant gaps regarding the scope of privatiz-
ing water management and access.102
The weak management of water resources by Peru’s pub-
lic sector has resulted in widespread water pollution as well as 
increased concentration of water access by extractive industries 
and some major cities.103 These trends are further generating 
socio-environmental conflicts. For example, the Ombudsman 
Office, which monitors conflicts in Peru, reported 32socio-envi-
ronmental conflicts in April 2007 and 132 in October 2009 (79 
percent involving mining and hydrocarbon companies).104 The 
conflicts between corporations and local communities center 
around inter-basin water transfer, water access, and ownership. 
Some of the corporations involved include hydropower compa-
nies, rural communities, and mining companies.105
Conflicts have also increased between communities in 
micro-watersheds regarding water division, scarcity and degra-
dation. The effects of climate change over the last thirty years 
have only worsened these problems.106 In the Peruvian Andes, 
for example, communities are estimated to have lost fifty percent 
of their water from sources such as springs and high-altitude 
wetlands (bofedales), creating vulnerable rural communities and 
decreased food security.107 Although Andean communities are 
accustomed to climate variations, they are also facing increas-
ing limitations on social governance of rural communities under 
such adverse circumstances.108 Lack of vision and limited socio-
technical capacity for public governance provide no support for 
Andean adaptation efforts, which is worsened in conflicts with 
economically powerful stakeholders.109
The newest Peruvian government regime has a different 
discourse regarding rural communities and indigenous peoples, 
speaking of “inclusion.”110 However, as seen in neighboring 
Bolivia and Ecuador,111 which also have governments who 
are supposedly “anti-neoliberal” policy discourse is often only 
rhetoric as mega-cities and agribusiness or extractive industries 
pressure for water access and control for– water flows in the 
direction of power.112
cIvIl socIeTy resPonses
A variety of responses from populations affected by dis-
possession of water or land and environmental pollution have 
emerged. In general, such mobilizations are both dispersed 
and localized throughout the continent.113 They vary from road 
blockades to litigation, and eventually to partial agreements.114 
Frequently, mobilizations rely on specialized advice from civil 
society organizations working with local leaders.115 In some 
cases, mobilizations can lead to the temporary inclusion of the 
conflict into public and political dialogues.116 However, any 
dialogue is typically prolonged over long periods of time while 
the controlling elite maintains the status quo by dividing the 
mobilizations and prosecuting their leaders.117 However, a select 
few civil society responses have been more successful. In Ecua-
dor, for instance, various social groups—mestizos, montubios, 
indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorians—mobilized to advocate for 
the inclusion of water rights principles in the Ecuador Constitu-
tion in 2008.118 These groups, working with the Water Resources 
Forum (Foro de los Recursos Hídridicos) and the National 
Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), 
held three major events focusing on the issues of water rights, 
allocation, and concentration.119 Approximately 1000 civil soci-
ety delegates from around the country participated, discussing 
water rights at length.120 The conclusions of the delegates were 
then delivered to the Assembly, whose representatives publicly 
committed to incorporating the proposals for the equitable redis-
tribution of water in the political and constitutional plane.121 
The Constitution, approved in October 2008, incorporates the 
proposed redistribution of water in the following terms:
 The Executive Branch, within two years after the 
entry into force of the present Constitution, shall review 
the situation of access to irrigation water for the purpose 
of granting concessions, avoiding abuse and inequity in 
the fees charged for water use, and guaranteeing more 
equitable distribution and access, especially for small 
and medium-sized farm and cattle producers.122
It should be clarified, however, that the Ecuadorian govern-
ment has not followed through with this proposal.123 More pres-
sure is needed from social organizations, particularly along coastal 
regions where the concentration process is the most severe. 
Currently, a new water resources bill is pending in the 
Ecuadorian legislature.124 Also addressed was the human right 
to water.125 Without a doubt, one of the most transcendental 
subjects in the debate was the decentralization of water.126 The 
national indigenous movement also presented on two main 
themes. The first revealed the large amount of irrigation that is 
concentrated among the wealthy as a result of the concessions or 
water theft.127 The second was the implementation of a collec-
tive right under the 2008 law that makes water a public asset.128
In Mexico, less powerful social groups, such as rural and 
indigenous, low-income urban residents, and small businesses, 
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are also taking various lines of action. These groups are promot-
ing local management and action, such as advocating that private 
corporations obtain renewable permits from local communities 
to develop and use water resources, and pay communities to 
preserve water resources from production.129 The movements 
focus on local control of springs, rivers and wells in addition 
to some agricultural water.130 These community actions have 
involved regulations on access to water, shared responsibilities 
to maintain common availability, defensive actions to protect 
community assets, and agreements with neighbors.131 A second 
promising trend is the preference for smaller water systems and 
less-centralized administration. In the last two decades, social 
opposition to large water systems, such as inter-basin transfers 
and dams, has come back to life.132 Conversely, governmental 
programs are now accepting smaller works, even involving 
direct labor input by local inhabitants.133 
A third trend is an increase in mobilization and direct politi-
cal action, particularly in the heaviest conflicts. These actions 
generally overlap with local action, involving coalitions of com-
munity authorities, groups of neighbors, and national or interna-
tional non-governmental organizations.134 
In Peru, like in Mexico, the mobilizations are usually less 
coordinated and less integrated between local and national 
movements.135 However, increasing social mobilizations has 
generated political influences that commonly express themselves 
in electoral processes and strengthen movements at the regional 
and national levels.136 These movements generate high expecta-
tions by the affected populations, but their impacts on big inter-
ests and dominant powers are rarely substantial.137 Instead, the 
influence of international opinion is frequently more influential 
in the Peruvian government.138
When mobilizations begin to have a political presence, the 
government actively works to divide the movements and weaken 
momentum.139 Recent political changes that promise social and 
cultural inclusion or new discourse rarely come to fruition.140 
For actual change to take place there needs to be a restructuring 
of the Peruvian government and a redefining of its relationship 
with the population.141 In Peru, the government resistance is ever-
stronger, easily overcoming the cries for water equity by social 
mobilizations.142
conclusIon
In the last three decades, Latin America has experienced 
aggressive governmental implementation of neoliberal policies 
that are favorable to extractive exploitation and agro-export com-
panies.143 This has generated the accumulation and concentration 
of natural resources in the hands of the few at the expense of water 
security, food security, and less-privileged parts of society.144 The 
affected parties are enveloped in frequent conflicts. State interven-
tions often end unfavorably for rural and indigenous people in 
light of the massive power asymmetry and cultural marginaliza-
tion.145 Under these circumstances, these parties feel increasingly 
excluded and marginalized, making protest intense.146
This article has analyzed how in Ecuador, Mexico and Peru 
this process of water concentration limits and seriously affects 
potential for local development, prospects for survival among 
small communities and reproduction of the social fabric.147 
In “modern” Latin American societies, natural resources—
-particularly water—are valued predominantly in economic mar-
ket terms, to the detriment of social, cultural and environmental 
values.148 At the same time, these last two decades of interna-
tional policies claiming to democratize water management and 
decentralize decision-making, have instead aggressively taken 
over governments in the Latin American region, obscuring any 
interference by the majority of localized water users.149 Political 
and legal reform for water management is grounded in standard-
izing management norms.150 To facilitate bureaucratic control 
by “hydrocrats,” or to create an efficient market for water rights 
along neoliberal lines, it is considered necessary to leave behind 
the practices of the rural or indigenous population labeled 
as “backward.”151 Diversity in rules and rights is actively dis-
couraged because it would obstruct regional and international 
transfers and sales, which require a uniform legal framework.152 
Local rules and rights are considered anomalies that would curb 
investments and profits.153 Therefore, decentralized water poli-
cies are not replacing bureaucratic policies, but instead regiment 
and oppress local pluralism.154 Government bureaucracies are 
“reformed” to draft and enact legislation that enables water mar-
kets to emerge.155 Community and collective rights systems that 
do not fit in the neoliberal system are, by definition, denied as 
“backward” and “inefficient.”156
For these reasons, there is a lack of trust between the gov-
ernment and civil society with obvious exceptions when shared 
public governance is recognized by the public.157 This unwill-
ingness to engage in intercultural dialogue about management of 
natural resources, water, land, and territory is problematic.
The effects and impacts of concentrated water rights by 
dominant economic producers will likely worsen with increasing 
climate change phenomena.158 The vulnerability and poverty of 
rural peoples deepens as water is less available and competition 
increases. If this neoliberal policy and economic development 
model grounded in extractive industries and large agro-export 
companies remains, this situation of accumulation, concentra-
tion, and waste cannot change and conflicts over access to and 
uses of water, land and territories will only increase.
Nevertheless, “bottom-up” responses are useful. In some 
cases, large public protest and the proposals for alternative law and 
policy can be influential, potentially even influencing the national 
constitution, as in Ecuador. In other cases, as in Peru and Mexico, 
mobilization and alternative policy-making tend to be of lower 
profile and the few successes can be noticed especially in localized 
events. Along with protests and mobilizations by civil society and 
rural and indigenous communities against private and concentrated 
water rights, there is also a more subtle struggle for these constitu-
ents to establish and enforce their own rights and rules. 
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